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FAIR EMPLOYMENT FORUMS AFTER ALEXANDER v.
GARDNER-DENVER CO.: SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL
WILLIAM J. ISAACSON* AND WILLIAM C. ZIFCHAK**
INTRODUCTION
A perplexing issue for the employment-relations bench and bar
since the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' has
been the determination of the proper forum in which to protect the
substantive rights granted by the Act. For a decade lawyers, judges,
and arbitrators have struggled to dovetail the rights and remedies
available to the individual who may have suffered discrimination in
the workplace.2 Congress, while declaring war on employment dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin,3 refused to create a monolithic enforcement agency,4 choos-
*A.B., J.D., University of Michigan. Partner, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
New York City.
**A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Columbia University. Associate, Kaye, Scholer, Fier-
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Auth.-This article is based upon an address delivered by William J. Isaacson before the
Section of Labor Relations Law of the American Bar Association (ABA) at the ABA National
Institute on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in Washington, D.C., on May 9, 1974.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. II, 1972).
2. See generally Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination,
118 U. PA. L. Rav. 40 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Labor Arbitration]; Meltzer, Labor Arbi-
tration and Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 39 U.
CHI. L. Rav. 30 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies]; Note,
Title VII, the NLRB, and Arbitration: Conflict in National Labor Policy, 5 GA. L. REv. 313
(1971).
3. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individtal's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (Supp. II, 1972). Similar
restraints are imposed upon labor organizations. Id. § 2000e-2(c).
4. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1974); 110 CONO. Rsc. 13650-
52 (1964) (remarks of Senator Tower). Enforcement responsibility for Title VII is divided
between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), an agency of the federal
government which investigates violations and administers the Act, and the federal district
courts, which actually adjudicate claims. Any individual who believes that an employer, labor
organization, or employment agency has committed an unlawful act of discrimination may
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ing instead to establish the federal courts as the ultimate authority
by granting them plenary power to enforce statutory rights.5 Thus
the statute provides a range of remedial alternatives to aggrieved
individuals,' and tacitly permits resolution of discrimination claims
in established labor relations forums. 7
Encouraged by the proliferation of federal and state fair employ-
ment statutes and remedies,8 the concept of equal employment op-
file a charge with the EEOC or with a state fair employment agency where one exists, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. 11, 1972). The EEOC is
authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation of the charge and, when it determines that
there is "reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true," to "endeavor to eliminate any
such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation,
and persuasion." Id. § 2000e-5(b). If the Commission fails to secure voluntary compliance,
either it or the aggrieved party may bring a civil action in a United States district court. Id.
§ 2000e-5 (f) (1). The Commission also has authority to bring a civil action on its own motion
if it has "reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a
pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this
subchapter. . . ." Id. § 2000e-6(a). Upon finding a violation a court may "enjoin the respon-
dent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay. . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate." Id. § 2000e-5(g).
5. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
6. Private parties may resort to existing state and local fair employment agencies, id. §
2000e-5(c), the EEOC, id. § 2000e.5(b), and the federal courts, id. § 2000e-5(f), generally in
that order and assuming that jurisdictional prerequisites have been satisfied. Each successive
forum may conduct an independent inquiry. Id. §§ 2000e-5(b), (). The 1972 amendments to
Title VII empower the EEOC to initiate investigations and file lawsuits on its own motion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.A.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970).
7. The Supreme Court has noted:
[Tihe legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow
an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other
applicable state and federal statutes. The clear inference is that Title VII was
designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions
relating to employment discrimination.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974). See also Local 12, Rubber
Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); SErNATE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, EQUAL EMPLOYIENT OPORTUNrmIES ENFORcEMENT ACT
OF 1971, S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1971); 110 CoNG. REc. 7207 (1964)
(statement of Senator Clark).
8. There are several federal statutes that either are specifically addressed to certain forms
of employment discrimination or have been interpreted to encompass such issues. E.g.,
Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1970); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § § 621-34
(1970); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970). See also Exec. Order No.
11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). Many states have enacted fair employ-
ment practice statutes similar to Title VII. See generally BNA FEP 451:26-27 (1974).
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portunity has been extended to encompass diverse social groups,
such as women, the aged, and public employees.9 Discrimination
has become a paramount issue in the shop and at the bargaining
table."0 Predictably, theories of and remedies for discrimination
have become more sophisticated, evolving from straightforward re-
lief for individual or deliberate acts of discrimination"1 to the rooting
out of "systemic" discrimination, often challenged by whole classes
of plaintiffs, through total restructuring of the rules of the work-
place12 and the granting of substantial money damages. 3
9. The 1972 amendments to Title VII prohibit discrimination by the federal government,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. 1I, 1972), and state and local governments, id. § 2000e(f). The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970), bars discrimination
against workers between the ages of 40 and 65. Id. § 631. See generally In Pursuit of Fair
Employment: A Symposium on Recent Developments, 5 COLUm. HuzAN RiGiTS L. Rav. 261
(1973).
10. The EEOC now has a backlog of approximately 85,000 cases and the Commission has
estimated that the intake for fiscal year 1975 will be an additional 100,000 cases. SECnON OF
LABoR RELATIONs LAW, AtsmCAz BAR AssOCIATION, Report of the Committee on Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Law-Development of Law, Practice and Procedure, As it Affects
Labor Relations, in 1974 CoawrrEE REPoRTs 45 [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT]. "Hardly
a transaction between the worker and the employer does not involve the likelihood that
someone will file a charge that [fair employment] . . . laws have been violated." Address
by Robert Coulson, President of the American Arbitration Association, 27th Annual Meeting
of the National Academy of Arbitrators, Kansas City, Mo., Apr. 26,1974. The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Committee of the Labor Law Section of the American Bar Association has
predicted that, with energetic exercise of its new enforcement powers under the 1972 Equal
Employment Opportunity Act, the Commission "well could replace the National Labor Rela-
tions Board as the predominant federal agency in labor-management relations." ABA
REPORT, supra at45. One survey indicates that since 1960 the percentage of collective bargain-
ing agreements containing prohibitions on racial, sexual, or age discrimination has increased
from 22 percent to 74 percent. 2 BNA CoacTr-E BARGAUNnG NEGO'r. & Corr. 95:1 (1975).
See also Bender, Job Discrimination 10 Years Later, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, § 3, at 1,
col. 1; NEwswEEK, June 17, 1974, at 75.
11. See generally Edelsberg, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act-The First Year, 19 N.Y.U.
CoNF. LAB. 287 (1967).
12. In a landmark decision, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme
Court confirmed the principle expressed by several lower federal courts that inadvertent,
consequential job discrimination, as well as intentional discrimination, is prohibited by Title
VII, unless justified by business necessity. Id. at 432. See Committee on Civil Rights of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Use of Quotas, Goals and Affirmative
Action Programs to Overcome the Effects of RacialDiscrimination, 28 REcORD oFN.Y.C.B.A.
525, 528-30 (1973); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MicH. L. REv. 59 (1972). This principle, when
combined with the broad-ranging power of the federal courts to correct discriminatory condi-
tions, (see United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 984 (1972); 42U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp.
It, 1972)), has precipitated not only fundamental changes in those employment rules and
procedures found to be inherently discriminatory, but also court-decreed future affirmative
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The character of equal employment opportunity regulation thus
legislated by Congress, providing for a multiplicity of remedies to
be enforced through numerous governmental agencies, 4 has led
inevitably to the raising of fair employment issues before the en-
forcement agencies established either directly or indirectly under
the aegis of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA),5
namely, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and private
contract grievance arbitration. 6 The principal goals of the LMRA
action to compensate for the effects of past discrimination. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (sexually discriminatory maternity leave policy); Rosen v.
Public Serv. Elec. Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973) (sexually discriminatory pension plan in
collective bargaining agreement); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (imposition
of hiring quota to correct discriminatory past recruitment practices); Papermakers Local 189
v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (seniority
system unlawfully perpetuated effects of former discriminatory practices).
13. See, e.g., Lea v. Cone Mills, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971) (counsel fees); Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (back pay);
Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd, 10 FEP CASES 239
(6th Cir., 1975) (punitive damages). See also Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 9 FEP CASES 180
(6th Cir. 1975) (back pay and retroactive seniority). The EEOC increasingly has involved
itself in implementing conciliation agreements with substantial price tags for the charged
parties. The settlement among AT&T, the EEOC, and the Labor and Justice Departments
in 1973 required $51 million in back pay; the steel industry settlement in 1974 cost $31
million. Bender, Job Discrimination 10 Years Later, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, § 3, at 1, 5,
col. 8. See Barnard, Title VII Class Actions: The Recovery Stage, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv.
507 (1975).
14. See generally Beaird, Racial Discrimination in Employment: Rights and Remedies, 6
GA. L. REv. 469 (1972).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1970). The LMRA comprises the National Labor Relations Act,
ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley Act), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959). The agency prima-
rily responsible for administration of the LMRA is the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1970).
16. Discrimination issues generally have confronted the Board in the context of cases
involving alleged breach of a union's duty to represent employee members fairly. See, e.g.,
Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 209 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 85 L.R.R.M. 1389, 1390-91, (1974) (respondent
union, "by denying . . . women the use of [its] dispatch facilities upon the irrelevant,
invidious and unfair consideration of their sex, breached its duty of fair representation in
violation of [LMRA] Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) . . ."); Local 12, Rubber Workers, 150
N.L.R.B. 312, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966) (union's applica-
tion of racial seniority rosters and refusal to process grievances seeking to obtain elimination
of racially discriminatory practices found to constitute unfair labor practices because viola-
tive of union's statutory duty of fair representation).
In recent years, the issue of employer discrimination has been considered by the Board.
Compare Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973), aff'd sub nom.
United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin not, standing alone, "inherently destructive" of employ-
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have been first majoritarianism,17 then voluntarism. 18 In pursuit
ees' rights under LMRA section 7 and therefore not violative of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act; must exist actual evidence, not merely speculation, of nexus between alleged dis-
criminatory conduct and interference with employees in their exercise of statutory rights),
with United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969) (employer's policy and practice of invidious discrimi-
nation alone held violative of section 8(a)(1)).
The policies underlying Title VII also have been weighed where the Board has determined
the extent to which concerted activity by minority groups to protest against discrimination,
arguably an unfair labor practice, is protected under Title VII. See, e.g., The Emporium, 192
N.L.R.B. 173, 77 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1971), reu'd sub noma. Western Addition Community Organ-
ization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), reu'd, 95 S. Ct. 977 (1975). In Western
Addition a group of minority employees, to protest the employer's racially discriminatory
promotion policies, engaged in self-help activity when their union refused to process their
grievance on a group rather than individual basis. The Board sustained their summary
dismissal, holding that the abandonment of the contractual grievance-arbitration procedure
to seek, through concerted activity outside of their union, to bargain as individuals with the
employer to change working conditions was unprotected under section 7 of the Act. 192
N.L.R.B. at 185, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1670. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, reasoning that Title VII accords distinctive status to peaceful protest against
allegedly discriminatory practices, 485 F.2d at 928, and therefore that the premise of section
9(a) of the LMRA, that the will of the individual must be subjugated to the will of the
majority, is inapplicable in this context: "[Tihe purposes of the minority group and the
union in desiring to eradicate racial discrimination in employment cannot be at odds." Id.
at 928-29. The Sipreme Court, however, reversed the court of appeals, holding that to immu-
nize under the Act an attempt by a group of minority employees at separate bargaining with
their employer over issues of employment discrimination, thereby circumventing the employ-
ees' exclusive bargaining representative, inevitably would fragment the bargaining unit and
thus subvert the principle of majority rule that is central to the Act's policies and which
secures the collective strength and bargaining power of the employees. 95 S. Ct. at 986-89.
While placing decisive emphasis in the circumstances presented upon maintenance of "the
orderly collective-bargaining process contemplated by the NLRA", id. at 988, the Court did
not foreclose "the possibility that in some circumstances rights created by the NLRA and
related laws affecting the employment relationship must be broadened to accommodate the
policies of Title VII." Id. at 990 n.26.
Significantly, the Court left undecided the question whether minority group self-help activ-
ity nevertheless is protected under section 704(a) of Title VII. Id. at 989-90. In terms of the
practical effect on an employer's dealings with employee minority groups, the resolution of
this issue is equally crucial. See notes 122, 145 infra & accompanying text. For a discussion
of Western Addition see Gould, Racial Protest and Self-Help Under Taft-Hartley: The West-
ern Addition Case, 29 AR. J. (n.s.) 161 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Racial Protest]; Note,
Racial Discrimination in Employment and the Remedy of Self-Help: An Unwarranted
Addition, 15 Wm. & MARY L. PEv. 615 (1974).
For an analysis of the NLRB's controversial role in adjudicating fair employment issues,
see Address by former NLRB Chairman Miller, Kansas City Bar Ass'n Seminar on Collective
Bargaining, the Labor Contract, and Impact of Fair Employment Practices, Apr. 11, 1974,
in 87 LAB. RL.. REP. 328 (1974).
17. Enacted with the express purpose of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collec-
tive bargaining and . . .protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing. . .", 29 U.S.C. § 151
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of these goals a consensual system of industrial self-government
premised upon majority rule, comprehending the informal, private
resolution of labor disputes, has been created.' The cornerstone of
this system has been industrial arbitration," which reached its apo-
gee with the development and judicial acceptance of the NLRB's
Spielberg-Collyer doctrine of administrative deferral to the private
arbitration process .2
In-contrast the emphasis under Title VII is upon public champi-
oning of individual or minority-group rights in the face of private
intolerance or indifference.Y Although voluntary conciliation is en-
couraged by statute,2m one of the premises of Title VII is that the
collective process refined by labor and management consciously has
soft-pedaled minority rights, which therefore must be vindicated in
a public forum.24
(1970), the LMRA provides in section 9(a) that "fr]epresentatives designated or selected for
the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining . . . ." Id. § 159(a). See Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Organization, 95 S. Ct. 977 (1975).
18. Labor Management Relations Act § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1970), provides in part: "iMt
is the policy of the United States that. . . the settlement of issues between employers and
employees through collective bargaining may be advanced by making available full and
adequate government facilities for conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration ... "
19. Labor Management Relations Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 174(d) (1970), provides: "Final
adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method
for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an exist-
ing collective bargaining agreement."
20. See generally Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 ARn. J. (n.s.)
13 (1955).
21. In two landmark decisions, Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152
(1955), and Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971), the NLRB
institutionalized a process of agency deferral to the arbitration process. See notes 148-59 infra
& accompanying text. For a more extensive treatment of this significant LMRA development,
see Isaacson & Zifchak, Agency Deferral to Private Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 73
COLUM. L. REv. 1383 (1973).
22. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974); Western Addition Com-
munity Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 928-29 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 977
(1975).
23. The Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 95 S. Ct.
977 (1975); see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496,497-98 (5th Cir. 1968). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970),
providing in part: "If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is rea-
sonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate
any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, concilia-
tion, and persuasion." Only after the Commission has been unable to secure an acceptable
conciliation agreement may it file a civil suit in federal district court. Id. § 2000e-5(e).
24. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974); Oubichon v. North
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One of the main battlegrounds of this ideological struggle between
competing values has been the area of arbitration, a principal mech-
anism in the administration of collective agreements and the quin-
tessence of voluntarism. The controversy over the respective roles
of courts and arbitrators in the enforcement of Title VII focused
upon whether the disposition by arbitration award of a discrimina-
tion complaint could foreclose an employee's right to a trial de novo
of his claim under Title VII. Proponents of the arbitration process
argued that the award should end the matter if in fact it properly
and adequately addressed the discrimination claim and the grievant
was accorded due process.2 Advocates of de novo judicial considera-
tion cited the clear statutory supremacy of the courts, the contrast-
ing natures and functions of the arbitral and judicial remedies, and
the fact that Title VII was enacted in part to overcome the tendency
of the parties, through processes of collective bargaining, to compro-
mise minority rights.21 The debate did not concern the desirability
of protecting civil rights, but whether arbitration, as the creature of
labor and management, the alleged offenders against those rights,
could or would likely vindicate them in accordance with statutory
mandate. The expectation was that, within the flexible confines of
Title Vii's emphasis on voluntary conciliation, a useful accommoda-
tion with bona fide arbitration awards could be worked out.
After nearly a decade of debate, the United States Supreme
Court, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,2 addressed the status
of an arbitration award vis-a-vis Title VII. The Court unanimously
held that under no circumstances would prior submission of a claim
of discrimination to contractual arbitration constitute an absolute
bar to a trial de novo of that claim in a federal district court;2
rather, the award merely would be admissible as evidence in the
Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1973); Gould, Judicial Review of Employ-
ment Discrimination Arbitration, in LABOR A~aarrATioN AT Tra QuAMSrE-CENTURY M 114,
117 (G. Somers & B. Dennis eds. 1972) (Proceedings of the 25th Annual Meeting, National
Academy of Arbitrators) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Review].
25. Coleman, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act: Four Years of Irocedural Elucidation, 8
DUQUESNE L. REv. 1, 24 (1970). See also Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and
the Role of Arbitration Under Title VH, 69 MicH. L. Ray. 599, 651-52 (1971); Judicial Review,
supra note 24, at 134-35. See cases discussed notes 35-41 infra & accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies, supra note 2, at 43-46. See cases
discussed notes 42-63 infra & accompanying text.
27. 415 U.S. 36 (1974); see notes 72-119 infra & accompanying text.
28. 415 U.S. at 59-60.
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court's ultimate equation. 21
The rigid position taken in Alexander is at once frustrating and
intriguing to the labor relations practitioner. Supported in law by
the undeniable statutory grant to the courts of plenary power over
Title VII causes of action, the holding nonetheless signals a total
break with the decade-long attempt to reconcile available fair em-
ployment remedies. The Court clearly implied that, in the area of
equal employment opportunity, it will give no quarter to arbitration
as it now functions." In the short run, Alexander thus has impaired
the continued vitality of the traditional arbitral remedy. The parties
to collective bargaining have been challenged to improve the pro-
cess; if they succeed, Alexander suggests that sufficient play re-
mains in the statute to permit eventual accommodation between
Title VII and arbitration.
On a broader scale, Alexander has established equal employment
opportunity as the benchmark against which all forums and reme-
dies in labor relations are to be judged. The long-term implications
of this policy declaration for the process of collective bargaining and
the administration of the collective agreement are so ominous that
it is open to serious question whether the Court fully comprehended
them. Not only has arbitration been threatened, but the doctrinal
approach of the National Labor Relations Board to the regulation
of collective bargaining has come under increasing attack.3' As the
finality of arbitration has been challenged, the finality of collective
bargaining itself has been brought into question. Oddly, at a time
when the Board, pursuing the policies of earlier Supreme Court
decisions3 2 has been cultivating the practice of deferring to arbitra-
tion in appropriate circumstances,3 Alexander has undermined the
rationale and legitimacy of such an approach .3 Thus, while labor
and management rethink their approach to arbitration, the Su-
preme Court, to avoid institutional conflict, also inevitably must
29. Id. at 60.
30. Holding that the employee had not waived his right to a Title VII cause of action, the
Court stated: "Of necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining
process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind
Title VIL" Id. at 51. But see Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
See note 118 infra & accompanying text.
31. See note 16 supra.
32. See notes 148-49 infra & accompanying text.
33. See notes 148-59 infra & accompanying text.
34. See notes 160.67 infra & accompanying text.
446 [Vol. 16:439
TITLE VII FORUMS
rethink its conceptual approach to this broader problem.
It is desirable to review the judicial forerunners of the Alexander
opinion, to examine the opinion itself and the policies it appears to
represent, and to ponder its ramifications for labor institutions, in
particular arbitration. Approaches then can be suggested for the
parties to collective bargaining who must adjust to Alexander's
immediate demands.
JuDIcrA ANTECEDENTS OF Alexander
Before Alexander, the federal courts of appeals had devised three
distinctly different approaches to the proper relationship between
Title VII and arbitration." The earliest was that prior resort to
arbitration barred subsequent Title VII litigation. This approach is
represented by the Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.3" decision in the
Sixth Circuit and the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in Alexander,7 which embraced Dewey in its entirety. In
Dewey, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that once an
employee has pursued his claim of discrimination through arbitra-
tion to an award mutually binding upon the company and the
union, he, individually, has made a final and binding election of
forums.3 The court concluded with a flourish that arbitrators have
the right finally to determine grievances for allegedly discriminatory
discharges,39 and that to bind the employer but not the employee
"could sound the death knell to arbitration of labor disputes."4 The
strict-bar rule espoused by*Dewey nevertheless proved to be a dras-
35. For a full historical treatment of the early struggle of the courts with the interplay
between arbitration and Title VII, see Comment, Policy Conflict: Should an Arbitration
Award Be Allowed To Bar a Suit Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? 20
U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 84 (1972). See also Comment, Deferral to Arbitration in Title Vi Actions:
Rios v. Reynolds Metals Company, 14 Whi. & MARY L. Ryv. 1003 (1973).
36. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
37. 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972). See note 73 infra.
38. 429 F.2d at 332. Dewey involved the relatively rare issue of religious discrimination.
Thus, the lack of divisiveness experienced in the workplace because of religious, rather than
racial, disputes, and the comparative lack of enthusiasm displayed by the Dewey court for
championing religious beliefs in the face of a collective bargaining agreement, id. at 336, may
have blinded the court to the pitfalls inherent in arbitration of Title VII issues.
39. Id. at 331-32, 336-37. Aside from the many objectionable aspects of the Dewey court's
attitude toward the issue of coordination of remedies, its opinion is open to serious question
on other grounds. For example, since the court's discussion indicates that the contract did
not specifically prohibit religious discrimination, it is questionable whether the arbitrator
even had jurisdiction to rule on the Title VII issue. Id. at 328-29.
40. Id. at 332.
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tic and unrealistic solution to the problem of coordinating remedies.
Grounded in inappropriate and simplistic notions of election of rem-
edies and forums, the inflexibility of this approach would preclude
judicial consideration of the inequities often prevalent in arbitration
involving obvious or latent discrimination claims by individuals or
classes of employees."
The second approach ultimately spawned the Supreme Court's
Alexander holding that, because Title VII and arbitration offer dis-
tinct and independent remedial processes, a court's authority to
adjudicate Title VII-claims cannot be precluded by the mere exist-
ence of an adverse arbitration award. This principle first was ex-
pressed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hutchings
v. United States Industries, Inc., 2 in which the court, rejecting a
strict-bar rule,4" held: "An arbitration award, whether adverse or
favorable to the employee, is not per se conclusive of the determina-
tion of Title VII rights by the federal courts ... ." The court corn-
41. The Dewey approach was resurrected as late as October 1973 by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1973). On the
ground that the contract gave her no right to her prior job when on leave of absence, the
arbitrator in Rios denied a female employee's claim that the company had wrongfully failed
to reinstate her in preference to two junior male employees. The court would not recast the
claim as a civil rights violation and thus proceed de novo in federal court. This result was
reached despite the absence of any indication that the applicable labor contract contained
an antidiscrimination clause, and even though it is unlikely that the arbitrator determined
or even considered the sex discrimination claim. Id. at 80607. Thus, the employee effectively
was precluded from raising in court the issue of whether the recall or seniority system itself
was discriminatory.
42. 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970). Hutchings subsequentlylapsed into obscurity, particularly
after the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Rios v. Reynolds Metal Co., 467 F.2d 54
(5th Cir. 1972), adopted an analogue of the NLRB's Spielberg principle of selective deferral
to arbitration awards. See notes 64-71 infra & accompanying text. The principle expressed
in Hutchings, that arbitration awards have no necessary impact upon the authority of a
federal court pursuant to Title VII, is not inconsistent with Rios, however. See 467 F.2d at
57. Although Hutchings is the logical forerunner of the Supreme Court's Alexander opinion,
the latter decision in fact perverted the reasoning of Hutchings to apply a rule far more
inflexible than any ever comprehended by the Hutchings court.
43. 428 F.2d at 311. The district court had ruled that, by pursuing his claim to an unsuc-
cessful conclusion under the contractual grievance-arbitration machinery, plaintiff had made
a binding election of remedies, and therefore was bound by the adverse award. Hutchings v.
United States Indus., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 691, 693 (E.D. Tbx. 1969). Plaintiff Hutchings twice
had charged the company with racial discrimination in failing to promote him. Both claims
were submitted to the grievance procedure; the second was pursued to arbitration and re-
sulted in an unfavorable award. Subsequently Hutchings filed a charge with the EEOC,
which provided him with a notice of right to sue after its investigation resulted in a finding
of no reasonable cause. Id. at 692.
44. 428 P.2d at 311. Cf. Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1973).
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pared Title VII with arbitration and concluded that each serves a
distinct purpose, promoting separate though complementary rights
and remedies. 5 While recognizing that, "when possible," Title VII
issues should not be withdrawn from the private arbitration pro-
cess,4" the court emphasized that the power of the courts to adjudi-
cate Title VII issues remains unaffected by an arbitration award.47
It concluded: "Congress. . has made the federal judiciary, not the
EEOC or the private arbitrator, the final arbiter of an individual's
Title VII grievance.' 5
The Hutchings opinion hinted strongly, however, that the subse-
quent adoption of a rule of deferral to arbitration would not be
inconsistent with its basic reasoning. Its main premise, which dis-
tinguishes the decision from the Supreme Court's subsequent
Alexander opinion, is not that Title VII compels a de novo trial of
discrimination issues, but rather that it is the court, as the statuto-
rily designated final arbiter, and no other body, which is to judge
on a case-by-case basis whether arbitration has made a proper de-
termination of Title VII rights. 9
45. 428 F.2d at 311. The court reasoned that whereas arbitration is a private, conseansual
process, strictly contractual in nature, Title VII litigation "takes on a public character in
which remedies are devised to vindicate the policies of the Act, not merely to afford private
relief to the employee." Id. The respective roles of the judge and arbitrator were contrasted:
while the arbitrator "'may consider himself constrained to apply the contract and not give
the types of remedies available under Title VII, even though the contract may contain an
anti-discrimination provision'," id. at 312, quoting Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d
711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969), the district judge is invested under Title VII with considerable
remedial discretion. Id. Arguably, however, this analysis is only decisive when in fact the
arbitrator either does not or cannot consider Title VII issues. The issue skirted by the
Hutchings court is the status of an arbitration award and the relationship of the respective
forums if the arbitrator legitimately has considered and decided the Title VII claim. See Rose
v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804, 812 n.13 (7th Cir. 1973).
46. 428 F.2d at 313.
47. Significantly, the court cited in support of this point language quoted from an earlier
decision under the LMRA, Lodge 12, IAM v. Cameron Iron Works, 257 F.2d 467, 473 (5th
Cir. 1958), which differentiated the contractual nature of arbitrable contract violations from
the statutory nature of unfair labor practices. While reasoning that "[s]ince the Board's
power is plenary in all respects, 'neither the existence of an agreement to arbitrate nor a
rendered award can preclude the Board from exercising its statutory jurisdiction,"' the
Hutchings court added: "Even though the Board is not bound by an arbitration award...
it may even, in the exercise of its discretionary power, decline action because an award has
been made or arbitration is possible." 428 F.2d at 313 n.9, quoting 257 F.2d at 473. Subse-
quently, in Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1972), the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit applied this reasoning in grafting the deferral principle onto Title VII
proceedings. See notes 64-71 infra & accompanying text.
48. 428 F.2d at 313-14.
49. Although the pertinent labor contract contained antidiscrimination language that cre-
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The opinions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc.5 and of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Oubichon v. North Ameri-
can Rockwell Corp.51 adhere to the basic premise of Hutchings, but
enunciate significant refinements that may well bring them into line
with the accommodation concepts expressed by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit in Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co.12 In
Macklii the court of appeals, rejecting "a mechanistic application
of the election of remedies doctrine, 5 3 stressed that the employee's
racial discrimination claim had not been presented in the grievance
proceeding, that the proceeding had no contractual basis for dispos-
ing of such a charge,54 and that the complaint alleged inadequate
representation of the employee by his union.5 Similarly, in
Oubichon the settlement of a grievance favorable to the employee
under grievance-arbitration machinery was held not to bar subse-
quent Title VII litigation regarding the lawfulness of the actions
giving rise to the grievance,5 where the plaintiff had alleged a pat-
tern of discriminatory acts, including several not resolved under the
contract.57
What is most significant about these two opinions is the reasoning
ated arbitral jurisdiction over Title VIE claims, id. at 311, the court noted: "The record in
this case does not reveal whether Title VII rights, or similar contractual rights, were ever
considered during the processing of Hutchings' grievances. . . . In view of the state of this
record, we leave for the future the question whether a procedure similar to that applied by
the Labor Board in deferring to arbitration awards when certain standards are met might
properly be adopted in Title VII cases." Id. at 314 n.10. Thus, because in Hutchings the rights
and remedies at issue in the contractual proceeding and those at issue in the Title VII forum
in fact differed, the court's refusal to defer was sound.
50. 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
51. 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973).
52. 467 F.2d 54 (Sth Cir. 1972). See notes 65-67 infra & accompanying text.
53. 478 F.2d at 992.
54. Id. at 991.
55. Id. at 992.
56. 482 F.2d at 574. The award or settlement was held to be "prima facie evidence" that
the grievant had received and accepted full satisfaction of his claim; thus the grievant had
the burden of showing that the award or settlement was not intended to be complete, either
because not all Title VII issues were considered or because available contractual remedies
were limited in scope. Id. Moreover, according to Oubichon, a grievant who has received full
compensation nevertheless may bring a class action for the class he represents. Id.
57. Id. at 571-72. Oubichon, a black employee, charged the defendant with a series of
related discriminatory acts during a nine-month period. A grievance regarding the first two
incidents resulted in a settlement favorable to the plaintiff; for the latter two incidents,
Oubichon went directly to the EEOC. Id. at 570-72.
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underlying their decision to keep Title VII channels open to a claim-
ant. The Hutchings court had stressed the structural and functional
differences between arbitration and court proceedings, although
these distinctions, particularly when contractual and statutory
rights have coalesced into a contractual prohibition of discrimina-
tion, arguably are of no consequence. In Macklin and Oubichon,
however, the Dewey principle is rejecteds largely because of a
different consideration, the subjective deficiencies peculiar to arbi-
tration of charges of racial discrimination. Thus, to the company's
contention in Oubichon that it was inequitable to bind the em-
ployer, but not the grievant, to an arbitration award or grievance
settlement, the court retorted:
However, to hold the employee to the result of the grievance
proceedings might prove equally unfair. It is natural for a union
member to lodge a grievance against his employer when he feels
he has one. . . . Indeed, bargaining agreements often make
employees resort [to] grievance machinery mandatory. Yet,
under Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,. .. (1967), the union-not
the employee-has wide control over the settlement and pro-
cessing of employee grievances. The union's presentation of the
case and selection of an arbitrator may seem unsatisfactory to
the employee, but the bargaining agreement nonetheless binds
him by the outcome. Further, the interest of unions and of man-
agement in arbitration are not always adversary .... This
conflict-of-interest problem is accentuated where, as in the in-
stant case, both union and employer are accused by the grievant
as coconspirators in racial discrimination."
Similarly, in Mackin the court emphasized that "the finality cus-
tomarily accorded to decisions by such [contractual] dispute set-
tling machinery . . . is hardly absolute, especially where, as here,
the fairness of the grievance settlement procedures is questioned.""
58. 478 F.2d at 990-91; 482 F.2d at 572-73.
59. 482 F.2d at 573. See notes 115-19 infra & accompanying text.
60. 478 F.2d at 991-92. Macklin involved a class action by black union members charging
both the employer and union with maintaining a racially discriminatory hiring system for
over-the-road driving positions. Macklin's original individual grievance had involved only
whether under the applicable contract the employer was obligated to offer him such a posi-
tion; race discrimination was not then raised as an issue.
The court's stress on the absence of contractual language tracking Title VII and the griev-
ance board's failure to consider the discrimination issue, id. at 991, was deemed the "impor-
tant distinction" between Macklin and the facts before the court of appeals in Alexander v.
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Macklin and Oubichon thus focus on the crucial shortcoming of
the arbitral process in the area of discrimination, namely, its three-
cornered character. Even the most scrupulous arbitrator may have
a blindspot with respect to the circumstances surrounding the pro-
cessing of a grievance involving discrimination issues.', A union
often may be indifferent to the possibility that a minority-group
grievant has suffered discrimination, and therefore may not prose-
cute that part of the case vigorously before the arbitrator. This
absence of "harmony of interest' 62 can be particularly prejudicial if
the employer and union, as charged in Macklin and Oubichon,63
deliberately or effectively align together against the grievant. Occa-
sionally a union will pursue a member's grievance for political rea-
sons with the understanding that the adjudication is to be a com-
plete sham. In such circumstances, without further safeguards, a
fair adjudication is improbable.
In summary, the Hutchings line of cases is sound. Their state-
ment of the basic premise of Title VII litigation-the absolute statu-
tory right of a claimant to have his cause of action entertained by a
judicial forum-is indisputable. Moreover, the rationale expressed
for refraining from the adoption of a strict-bar rule is likewise sound.
The crucial issue, not reached by Hutchings, Macktin nor
Oubichon, however, concerns whether arbitration nevertheless can
and should be structured to resolve Title VII issues, and if so, what
weight courts should accord to an arbitration award as a matter of
law at the threshold of a Title VII proceeding.
It is the third line of pre-Alexander decisions that confronted the
issue of accommodation and satisfactorily resolved it. Determined
to avoid a hard-and-fast rule, the courts sought a satisfactory ac-
Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972). This reasoning indicates that the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit would not have been unreceptive to a Rios
deferral rule in an appropriate case, despite its criticism of deferral under the circumstances
presented in the case before it. 478 F.2d at 992. See notes 65-67 infra & accompanying text.
61. See Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 1971), in which the union's
attitude in refusing to support appellant's claim of racial discrimination "was cited by the
arbitrator in deciding that there was no merit to appellant's separately argued race discrimi-
nation claim."
62. In the course of elaborating its Collyer doctrine of deferral to arbitration, the NLRB,
specifically in the area of alleged discrimination against union activity, generally has required
that the employee and his bargaining representative evince "substantial harmony" of interest
before deferral may be deemed appropriate. See Isaacson & Zifchak, supra note 21, at 1400-
01; note 115 infra & accompanying text.
63. See also Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1971).
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commodation which would permit them, as final arbiters of individ-
ual rights under Title VII, to defer in their discretion to prior arbi-
tration awards, but only after careful scrutiny assured that arbitra-
tion procedures had complied with the demands of public policy."
In Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co.'- the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, addressing the deferral question "left for the future"6 by
Hutchings, proffered a systematic approach to the evaluation of
arbitration awards, analogizing to the National Labor Relations
Board's Spielberg policy of deferral to arbitration awards under
specified circumstances. Withholding of plenary jurisdiction and
deferral to a prior award thus would be deemed consistent with the
statute only where the responding party made a threshold showing
(a) that contractual rights coincided with statutory rights to enable
the arbitrator to decide the issue of discrimination, (b) that the
arbitrator had addressed the specific issue presented to the court
and had disposed of it in ha manner consonant with the Act, and (c)
that the proceeding itself afforded due process to the grievant.17
64. This movement toward flexible accommodation originated with the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, the court that previously had given birth to the Dewey strict-bar rule.
Two subsequent opinions of that court, Spann v. Kaywood Div., Joanna Western Mills Co.,
446 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1971), and Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1971),
indicated that the nature of the arbitration and the context within which it proceeded were
appropriate considerations for a court in reviewing and weighing the effect of an arbitration
award. Spann limited the judicial preclusion decreed by Dewey to the situation "where all
issues are presented to bona fide arbitration and no other refuge is sought until that arbitra-
tion is totally complete." 446 F.2d at 123; accord, Thomas v. Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 455 F.2d
911 (6th Cir. 1972). In Spann an award generally favorable to the grievant was sustained, the
court noting that under the applicable labor contract the arbitrator had jurisdiction over
claims of racial discrimination. 446 F.2d at 123.
In Newman the court went further, interpreting Dewey not as requiring an election of
remedies, but rather as invoking an estoppel, 451 P.2d at 746-47, and then only if two
conditions were met: the grievance had been aired at a fair and impartial tribunal, and the
arbitrator possessed the contractual authority to decide the issue of discrimination. Id. at 747.
The court of appeals found that no estoppel arose on the merits, relying on three factors: the
plaintiff alleged a longstanding conspiracy to maintain a racially discriminatory workplace;
the union did not pursue at arbitration that portion of plaintiff's grievance alleging racial
discrimination; and the arbitrator did not have specific jurisdiction under the contract for
Title VII matters. Id. at 747-48.
65. 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972).
66. Id. at 55; see note 49 supra.
67. The court stated:
We hold that the federal district court in the exercise of its power as the final
arbiter under Title VII may follow a like procedure of deferral under the follow-
ing limitations. First, there may be no deference to the decision of the arbitrator
unless the contractual right coincides with rights under Title VII. Second, it
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The opinion in Rios is fully consistent with its earlier Hutchings
decision, reiterating that because federal courts are "'the final
arbiter[s]' ",6 of Title VII cases, "the determination in the arbitra-
tion process has no effect upon the power of the federal court to
adjudicate a violation of rights under Title VI" 89 Once squarely
confronted with the issue of accommodating a bona fide arbitration
award 70 however, the court in Rios concluded that a deferral rule
grounded entirely in judicial discretion would constitute a permissi-
ble and desirable method for "accommodat[ing] the national arbi-
tration process policy to Title VII proceedings without thwarting the
congressional intent in Title VII to eliminate discriminatory prac-
tices in employment."'"
ALEXANDER V. GARDNER-DENVER CO.: SUPREME COURT "RESOLUTION"
The Supreme Court's Opinion
Presented with the alternative approaches represented by Dewey,
Hutchings, and Rios, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.72 chose an extreme and inflexible approach, holding that
under no circumstances may the plenary jurisdiction of federal
courts over claims of discrimination under Title VII give way to an
arbitral determination.7 3 Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous
must be plain that the arbitrator's decision is in no way violative of the private
rights guaranteed by Title VII, nor of the public policy which inheres in Title
VII. In addition, before deferring, the district court must be satisfied that (1)
the factual issues before it are identical to those decided by the arbitrator; (2)
the arbitrator had power under the collective agreement to decide the ultimate
issue of discrimination; (3) the evidence presented at the arbitral hearing dealt
adequately with all factual issues; (4) the arbitrator actually decided the factual
issues presented to the court; (5) the arbitration proceeding was fair and regular
and free of procedural infirmities. The burden of proof in establishing these
conditions of limitation will be upon the respondent as distinguished from the
claimant.
467 F.2d at 58.
68. Id. at 57, quoting Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 313 (5th Cir.
1970).
69. 467 F.2d at 57.
70. Plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination clearly had been considered and rejected by
the arbitrator, whose jurisdiction was based on an antidiscrimination clause in the contract.
Id. at 56.
71. Id. at 57-58.
72. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
73. Factually, Alexander presented a poor vehicle for the proponents of deferral as a
method of accommodation. Plaintiff Alexander, a black employee who had been discharged
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Court, stressed the intention of Congress to entrust final responsibil-
ity for enforcement of Title VII to the federal courts, regardless of
the actions of the EEOC or private arbitrators.74 Therefore, no pro-
cedural barriers could be erected to obstruct individual access to the
plenary powers of the courts. 75 He rejected in turn arguments based
on election of remedies, waiver, and the federal policy favoring pri-
vate arbitration of labor disputes.
Justice Powell treated summarily the arguments advanced in
support of a strict preclusion rule. He reasoned that the clear import
of Title VT's legislative history, and that of analogous legislative
enactments, was "to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against
discrimination" where various statutory rights could be pursued
independently. 76 Because submission of a claim to one of the avail-
able public forums, such as a state fair employment agency, gener-
ally did not preclude later submission to another, such as the EEOC
or the courts, the inference is strong, he concluded, that prior sub-
mission to a private forum, such as arbitration, similarly should not
for incompetence as a drill operator, brought a grievance under the collective bargaining
agreement between the company and the United Steelworkers of America, of which he was a
member. That contract required discharge for proper cause and prohibited "discrimination
against any employee on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry."
Id. at 39. Prior to arbitration, Alexander filed a charge of racial discrimination with the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which referred the complaint to the EEOC. At the arbi-
tration hearing, he similarly accused the company of racial discrimination and the union of
lack of zeal in prosecuting his grievance; the arbitrator, in ruling that Alexander had been
discharged for just cause, did not refer specifically to the discrimination claim. Id. at 42.
The EEOC subsequently declined to find reasonable cause to believe thatthe company had
violated Title VII. Alexander then filed suit in district court, whereupon the company's
motion for summary judgment was granted on the theory that the adverse arbitration award,
pursuant to a proceeding in which the issue of discrimination had been submitted voluntarily,
barred suit under Title VII. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D.
Colo. 1971). The court relied only on plaintiffs statement in his deposition "aclmowledg[ing]
that this charge was before the arbitrator." Id. at 1014. The district judge embraced the
Dewey rationale in its entirety, offering two reasons: first, the court could not accept "a
philosophy which gives the employee two strings to his bow when the employer has only one,"
id. at 1019; second, because the employee voluntarily had elected arbitration, to hold him
not bound by its result would constitute unlawful preferential treatment of a minority group
member, id. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit afirmed per curiam the district
court's ruling, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), but the
Supreme Court reversed, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974). After a
trial de novo on remand, the district court held that the "record reflects a discharge for cause
unrelated to race" and thus dismissed the complaint. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 8
FEP Cases 1153, 1155 (D. Colo. 1974).
74. 415 U.S. at 47-48.
75. Id. at 47-49.
76. Id. at 47. See notes 4-B supra & accompanying text.
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preclude an individual's resort to the courts.77 Moreover, arbitration
involves the pursuit of distinct contractual rights; by contrast, Jus-
tice Powell argued: "[I]n filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an em-
ployee asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Con-
gress." ' Analogizing to the situation under the LMRA in which the
NLRB is not precluded from consideration of unfair labor practice
charges subsequent to submission of a contractual dispute to arbi-
tration "[w]here the statutory right underlying a particular claim
may not be abridged by contractual agreement, 7 9 Justice Powell
deemed the election of remedies doctrine wholly inapplicable."'
Finally he rejected the contention that Title VII rights could be
waived prospectively, either through the collective bargaining pro-
cess generally or in particular by prior submission to contractual
arbitration." He distinguished collective rights traditionally subject
to waiver by the employees' exclusive representative from the indi-
vidual rights protected by Title VII, which exist apart from the
process of collective bargaining and cannot be forfeited.82 He con-
cluded that, at most, a voluntary and knowing settlement expressly
conditioned on a waiver of a grievant's cause of action under Title
VII would be binding."'
Having disallowed any form of mechanical preclusion rule as too
simplistic and clearly contrary to legislative intent, Justice Powell
addressed the pragmatic issue of accommodation of a pervasive
industrial dispute remedy, arbitration, to a statutory scheme "de-
signed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and insti-
77. 415 U.S. at 47-48.
78. Id. at 49-50. Justice Powell continued: "The distinctly separate nature of these contrac-
tual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the
same factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights
to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums." Id. at 50.
79. Id. at 50.
80. Id. at 50-51.
81. Id. at 51-52.
82. Id. Justice Powell reasoned that, because waiver of Title VII rights "would defeat the
paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII," id. at 51, they could not be relinquished
by the uniori during collective bargaining in return for economic concessions, id. It would
follow that a waiver never could be achieved through the subterfuge of a nondiscrimination
clause incorporated into the contract providing the arbitrator with jurisdiction over Title VII
issues. Id. at 52. A legitimate waiver therefore would have to be extracontractual.
83. Id. at 52 n.15. The Court's expressed receptiveness to extracontractual waiver of a Title
VII cause of action is an important consideration for private parties in grappling with Title
VII issues in the post-Alexander era. See notes 169-70 infra & accompanying text.
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tutions relating to employment discrimination."84 His solution is
decidedly unaccommodating:
We think, therefore, that the federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion of labor disputes and the federal policy against discrimina-
tory employment practices can best be accommodated by per-
mitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the
grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment and his cause of action under Title VI 5
Henceforth, federal courts are to consider discrimination claims de
novo regardless of the existence of a prior arbitration award. Yet,
while Justice Powell dismissed a proposed deferral rule as
unworkable, 6 he established a novel principle: "The arbitral deci-
sion may be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the
court deems appropriate."87 In its already celebrated footnote 21,
the Court enumerated the factors to be considered in evaluating an
arbitration award and the effect to be given it, and in so doing
mirrored, ironically, the standards of review advanced by the Rios
deferral rule.s
84. Id. at 48.49.
85. Id. at 59-60.
86. Id. at 55-59.
87. Id. at 60. Under the normal rules of evidence, a prior judgment, if not a bar to a
subsequent civil action in a different forum, is inadmissible in the latter proceeding. C.
McCoPhucK, LAw OF EvmE~cE 739.40 (E. Cleary ed. 1972). See Meltzer, The Impact of
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver on Labor Arbitration, 27 N.Y.U. LAB. CoNp. 189 (1974).
The admissibility of arbitration awards in Title VII litigation had been suggested in deci-
sions prior to Alexander. See, e.g., Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 314
n.10 (5th Cir. 1970).
88. Justice Powell explicated the Court's evidential ruling:
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision, since
this must be determined in the court's discretion with regard to the facts and
circumstances of each case. Relevant factors include the existence of provisions
in the collective-bargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title
VII, the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the
iecord with respect to the issue of discrimination, and the special competence
of particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral determination gives full considera-
tion to an employee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great
weight. This is especially true where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically
addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an ade-
quate record. But courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enactingTitle
VII, thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution
of discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full
availability of this forum.
415 U.S. at 60 n.21; see note 67 supra.
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It is clear from the opinion that the Court did not deem itself
bound by the statute to reject the concept of accommodation; nei-
ther was the Court persuaded by the emphasis in Title VII on concil-
iation and voluntary settlement procedures that such accommoda-
tion must be attempted. The decision not to attempt accommoda-
tion, and thus to reject the deferral alternative, was conscious and
voluntary. It was rationalized, however, by an untenable characteri-
zation of the modern arbitration process. Indulging in caricature to
exaggerate distinctions between the arbitral and judicial processes,
notably in the adjudication of fair employment issues, the Court
effectively recanted its numerous prior endorsements of the primacy
of arbitration in labor relations.89
In a two-step process the Court contrasted arbitration and court-
room litigation. First, Justice Powell's opinion underscored "[t]he
distinctly separate nature of [the] contractual and statutory
rights"' 0 involved in the different forums. Arbitration of discharge
issues usually results from a contractual guarantee against dis-
charge except for "just cause" generally found in collective bargain-
ing agreements;9' discharge for a racially discriminatory reason, on
the other hand, is under the umbrella of the statutory proscriptions
of Title VII.
This difference, however, does not preclude labor arbitrators from
evaluating Title VII issues. An estimated 74 percent of collective
bargaining agreements now contain language prohibiting various
forms of employer discrimination. 2 Because incorporation of non-
discrimination clauses into collective agreements substantively al-
89. See 415 U.S. at 46 n.6. In a series of decisions rendered over the past 18 years, the Court
has promoted the arbitral remedy as the primary tool in industrial self-government and
accordingly has deemphasized the role of the federal courts in industrial disputes. See Boys
Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
379 U.S. 650 (1965); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). As recently as 1974, in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,
414 U.S. 368, 377 (1974), the Court reemphasized "[t]he federal policy favoring arbitration
of labor disputes" in upholding the arbitrability of safety disputes. For a general discussion
of the cases giving rise to arbitration's present favored status, see Isaacson & Zifchak, supra
note 21, at 1386.
90. 415 U.S. at 50.
91. For example, the applicable collective bargaining agreement in Knight Newspapers,
Inc., 58 Lab. Arb. 446, 448 (1972) (Platt, Arbitrator), contained the following language: "No
employee shall be dismissed except for just and sufficient cause."
92. 2 BNA COLLE rIVE BARGAINING NEGOT. & CoNT. 95: 1 (1975). See note 10 supra.
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ters the scope of arbitral jurisdiction, arbitrators frequently must
confront the "statutory" question of unlawful discriminatory moti-
vation or effect within the context of contractual "just cause" delib-
erations."3 Justice Powell's assertion that "[a]s the proctor of the
bargain, . . . [the arbitrator] has no general authority to invoke
public laws that conflict with [that] bargain"94 rests upon the false
premise that the parties to collective bargaining never incorporate
into their bargain public law concepts that may render nugatory
particular inconsistent provisions contained elsewhere in the agree-
ment.
Concededly, the presence of contract language tracking Title VII
should not authorize an arbitrator to consider the more complex
issues that arise under that statute. Indeed, where an operative
clause in a facially lawful labor contract perpetuates discriminatory
practices without a specific intent to discriminate unlawfully, it is
93. See, e.g., Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 8628 (1970)
(Currier, Arbitrator). In fact, there is considerable support for the proposition that a contrac-
tual "just cause" proviso in particular authorizes an arbitrator to refer to public law concepts
such as Title VII, despite the absence of specific contractual incorporation of that law into
the agreement. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960); San Val, Inc., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 8776 (1970)(Dunsford, Arbitrator);
Grand Auto Stores; 54 Lab. Arb. 766 (1970) (Eaton, Arbitrator).
In arbitrations involving issues other than discipline for "just cause," however, there is
considerable debate over whether Title VII principles should be consulted, particularly when
a nondiscrimination clause is absent and the arbitrator otherwise has not been authorized
specifically to consider federal law. Thus, if an applicable contract clause is racially discrimi-
natory on its face or directly contrary to a countervailing consent decree or EEOC regulation,
some arbitrators might consider it a legitimate exercise of authority to void the clause by
reference to public law concepts. See, e.g., Potlatch Corp., 63 Lab. Arb. 1057 (1974) (Heliker,
Arbitrator); Ingraham Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 884 (1966); Gould, Non-Governmental Remedies for
Employment Discrimination, 20 SYRACucs L. RaV. 865, 872-73 (1969); Howlett, The Arbitra-
tor, the NLRB, and the Courts, in Tim ARBrATOR, THE NLRB, AND Tim CounRTs 67, 83 (D.
Jones ed. 1967) (Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators).
Other arbitrators would enforce the contract as written. See, e.g., Milwaukee Area Tech.
College, 40 AIS 8 (1973) (Seitz, Arbitrator). See also Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies,
supra note 2, at 32-34. Some would decline jurisdiction altogether. See, e.g., Lockheed Mis-
siles & Space Co., 72-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 8360 (1972) (Koven, Arbitrator).
However, if contractual language is arguably discriminatory in effect only, absent specific
authority to invoke Title VII, the majority of arbitrators would not disturb the contract.
Compare Stardust Hotel, 61 Lab. Arb. 942 (1973) (Jones, Arbitrator), and Bliss & Loughlin
Indus., Inc., 64 Lab. Arb. 147 (1974) (McKenna, Arbitrator), with Roseville Bd. of Educ., 46
AIS 11 (1973) (Herman, Arbitrator). See generally McKelvey, The Presidential Address: Sex
and the Single Arbitrator, in ARBrRAr i AND ma PUBLC INTasRET 1, 1-3 (G. Somers & B.
Dennis eds. 1971) (Proceedings of the 24th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitra-
tors).
94. 415 U.S. at 53.
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questionable whether the arbitrator would have the authority to
void that provision on the ground that its implementation violated
Title VII, even if the contract contained a general prohibition of
discrimination. 5 It could be argued that the arbitrator would be
going beyond his jurisdiction or competence into an area properly
reserved for the courts. 6 Nevertheless, it is indisputable that under
certain circumstances arbitrators can and have adjudicated griev-
ances comprehending Title VII issues, thus requiring interpretation
and application of "public law."97
As a second step in his analysis, Justice Powell contrasted the
processes used respectively in litigation and arbitration to resolve
disputes. The arbitration process thus was painted as "conciliatory
and therapeutic,"" requiring an informal, relatively nonadversarial
atmosphere to encourage the settlement of a grievance in an "effi-
cient, inexpensive, and expeditious" manner.9 So characterized,
however, these qualities in the Court's view "[make] arbitration a
95. See id. at 53, 57. Even when the collective bargaining agreement contains a nondiscri-
mination clause, it is arguable that at this stage in the judicial exegesis of fair employment
law an arbitrator easily could go beyond his capabilities by adjudicating cases comprehending
complex issues and massive relief, such as the restructuring of seniority rules allegedly dis-
criminatory in effect. The Supreme Court indicated in Alexander that it would not condone
the interjection of the arbitrator's peculiar brand of justice, with its emphasis on give-and-
take compromise (see, e.g., Stardust Hotel, 61 Lab. Arb. 942 (1973) (Jones, Arbitrator)), into
the development of Title VII doctrine. It makes little sense, therefore, for arbitrators to "flesh
out" the statute for the parties in the course of construing their collective bargain, as has been
done under the LMRA. Blumrosen, Labor Arbitration, EEOC Conciliation, and Discrimina-
tion in Employment, 24 ARB. J. (n.s.) 88, 99 (1969); Isaacson & Zifchak, supra note 21, at
1413-14. The Court in Alexander stressed the need for judicial treatment of Title VII issues:
"IT]he resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts,
and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose
broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts."
415 U.S. at 57. Although some arbitrators have dealt with these issues at a simplified level,
as in Magee-Women's Hosp., 62 Lab. Arb. 987 (1974) (Joseph, Arbitrator) (improper forced
retirement at age 65 because no mandatory retirement provision in contract), they should
proceed with caution, particularly in complex or novel areas, and especially in light of the
Alexander decision. See, e.g., Centerville Clinics, Inc., 60 Lab. Arb. 691 (1973) (Grant,
Arbitrator) (decision confined to language of contract in view of unsettled status of case law
regarding pregnancy disability).
96. E.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 61 Lab. Arb. 844 (1973) (Murphy, Arbitrator)(refusal
to rule on subject covered by consent order in district court).
97. E.g., Glass Containers Corp., 57 Lab. Arb. 997 (1971) (Dworkin, Arbitrator) (sexually
discriminatory to prescribe limits of weight to be lifted by female employees). See generally
AsrrmAroN oF DIscRimNAvoN GRIvANCES (M. Stone & E. Baderschneider eds. 1974).
98. 415 U.S. at 55.
99. Id. at 58.
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less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than
the federal courts." 00
But this cortclusion also rests on an inaccurate conception of the
process. Although contractual grievance-arbitration machinery al-
ways has been designed to adjust grievances as amicably as possi-
ble, arbitration is but the final step in that process, invoked only
when all prior attempts to achieve an informal settlement have
failed.'0' Moreover, as collective bargaining contracts have become
increasingly complex and elaborate, arbitration has begun to ap-
proximate a formal, quasi-judicial adversary proceeding, in which
issues as subtle and legalistic as any embraced'by Title VII are
controverted. 0 2 Any significant procedural due process protections
absent from the arbitral process easily could have been engrafted by
the Court onto the existing procedural skeleton of arbitration specif-
ically for Title VII purposes.' 3 At least with regard to procedural
requisites, therefore, the Court's total disavowance of arbitration as
a Title VII forum was wholly unjustified.
Having established to its satisfaction the undesirability of accom-
modation through an emphasis on inherent structural distinctions
between arbitration and litigation, swift dismissal of the deferral
principle logically followed. Justice Powell reasoned: "Respondent's
deferral rule is necessarily premised on the assumption that arbitral
processes are commensurate with judicial processes and that Con-
100. Id.
101. Not atypical is the elaborate grievance-arbitration procedure in the present collective
bargaining agreement between U.S. Steel and the United Steelworkers. See 1 BNA CoL c-
Trv BARGAINING NEGOT. & CONsT. 29:1, 29:9-15 (1974).
102. See Aksen, Changing Patterns in Labor Arbitration, in LA0n LAW DEvEwLuoP S
1973, at 237 (V. Randall ed. 1973) (Proceedings of the 19th Annual Institute on Labor Law,
Southwestern Legal Foundation); Gross, The LaborArbitrator's Role: Tradition and Change,
25 ARn. J. (n.s.) 221, 221-25, 233 (1970). An early consequence of Alexander has been the
suggestion that the parties to collective bargaining reconsider the desirability of continuing
to move traditional arbitration in the direction of increasing complexity and formality. See
notes 169-73 infra & accompanying text.
103. It is not necessarily conceded that the federal courts per se provide a fairer, more
objective forum for the resolution of discrimination claims than arbitration. See Address by
Professor Christensen, Annual Meeting of the Section of Labor Relations Law of the ABA,
August 1974, in 87 LAB. REL. REP. 11, 18 (1974)("I have no hesitation in stating that none of
the factors mentioned by Mr. Justice Powell would dissuade me from arbitrating any claim
before Professor Archibald Cox or a host of other arbitrators rather than putting one foot
inside the courtrooms of the vast majority of either state or federal judges."). See also Rose
v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804, 812 n.13 (7th Cir. 1973); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
(1973) (Teple, Arbitrator), cited in A nrrnA'rON OF D Asc TmNA' GRmVACFS 84, 90 (M.
Stone & E. Baderschneider eds. 1974).
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gress impliedly intended federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions
on Title VII issues. We deem this supposition unlikely."'10 Because
the arbitration process, for the reasons stated, is "comparatively
inferior to judicial processes,"'0 5 because deferral would diminish
those qualities that enhance arbitration as an informal device for
resolving conflict,' 6 and because deferral might undermine the grie-
vant's incentive to arbitrate,' 7 the Court concluded that deferral
was an inappropriate and unworkable solution. 0
Inherent in the Court's analysis was a refusal even to weigh com-
peting values, although such a balancing might have facilitated a
constructive accommodation. The Court studiously avoided any
acknowledgment of its often reiterated principle that arbitration is
"the central institution in the administration of collective bargain-
ing contracts."'0 9 Its only reference to this tenet is the curt holding
that "the federal policy favoring arbitration does not establish that
an arbitrator's resolution of a contractual claim is dispositive of a
statutory claim under Title VIE."" 0 That the federal preference for
arbitration does not create an absolute bar to Title VII litigation
subsequent to an arbitration award hardly suggests, however, that
this preference should not have had some influence upon the Court's
resolution of the proper relationship between the courts and arbitra-
tion."'
104. 415 U.S. at 56 (emphasis supplied).
105. Id. at 57. But see note 103 supra.
106. 415 U.S. at 58.
107. Id. at 59. The Court explained that a deferral rule would encourage grievants to bypass
arbitration "[f]earing that the arbitral forum cannot adequately protect their rights under
Title VII ... ."Id. But given the practical and legal constraints militating in favor of resort
to grievance arbitration, the Court's reasoning is unsatisfactory. See notes 129-34 infra &
accompanying text.
108. 415 U.S. at 58-59.
109. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770,398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970), quoting Welling-
ton & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v.
Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1557 (1963).
110. 415 U.S. at 46 n.6.
111. A more balanced approach between competing national policies was suggested in Rios
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972):
It does not follow, however, that the policies of Title VII require that an
employee who has submitted his claim to binding arbitration must always be
given an opportunity to relitigate his claim in court. In some instances such a
requirement would not comport with elementary notions of equity, for it would
give the employee, but not the employer, a second chance to have the same issue
resolved. More importantly, such a requirement would tend to frustrate the
national policy favoring arbitration.
Id. at 57.
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Similarly, to support its contractual-statutory distinction, the
Court analogized to the procedure under the LMRA by which "con-
sideration of the claim by the arbitrator as a contractual dispute
under the collective-bargaining agreement does not preclude silbse-
quent consideration of the claim by the National Labor Relations
Board as an unfair labor practice charge .... 1,, Again, the Court
merely stated the obvious: private parties cannot, by contract, di-
vest public forums of jurisdiction over legal issues within their sta-
tutory charge. But divestiture is not the point. That the NLRB may
undertake an unfair labor practice proceeding following an arbitra-
tion has not discouraged the NLRB from declining jurisdiction on
its own motion, when, in its discretion, it deems an arbitration
award an adequate resolution of a statutory issue.113
By relying primarily on the asserted functional differences be-
tween the competing forums, the Court placed itself in the extreme
position of rejecting, as a matter of law, arbitration of Title VII
issues in particular, and disputes over statutorily protected minor-
ity rights generally. " 4 The Court made clear that, at least for the
present, in this area it will rely on the therapeutic value of the
arbitration process only. Yet if arbitration and judicial proceedings
are different in kind, then it is hard to envision a state of the arbitral
process that would cause the Court ever to reconsider its position.
In fact what may have troubled the Court more than the proce-
dural infirmities of arbitration was the likelihood that the arbitra-
tion process, as presently constituted, does not lend itself to detec-
tion of the chicanery of labor and management when dealing with
an allegation of discrimination by a minority-group employee."15
112. 415 U.S. at 50, citing Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
113. This attitude is represented by the Board's Spielberg doctrine, which frequently per-
mits the Board to defer to arbitration awards that, for example, have disposed of statutory
claims involving alleged union discrimination. E.g., National Radio Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No.
112, 84 L.R.R.M. 1105 (1973); Superior Motor Transp. Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 892, 82 L.R.R.M.
1083 (1972). See notes 148-59 infra & accompanying text.
114. See notes 163-67 infra & accompanying text.
115. One commentator has observed:
The difficulty here is not that arbitrators deny fair hearings to unions and
employers but that, particularly in cases involving individual rights, these hear-
ings are union and employer controlled. The adversary nature of the hearings,
for example, traditionally calls for a rather passive umpire who does little more
than "keep the ring," whereas the employer and the union initiate and prosecute
the case, investigate the facts, and present the proofs and arguments to the
arbitrator. The arbitrator then ascertains the intentions of the parties "not
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The Court made oblique reference to this problem in a single foot-
note:
A further concern is the union's exclusive control over the
manner and extent to which an individual grievance is pre-
sented. . . . In arbitration, as in the collective-bargaining pro-
cess, the interests of the individual employee may be subordi-
nated to the collective interests of all employees in the
bargaining unit. Moreover, harmony of interest between the
union and the individual employee cannot always be presumed,
especially where a claim of racial discrimination is made ...
In this respect, it is noteworthy that Congress thought it neces-
sary to afford the protections of Title VII against unions as well
as employers."'
The inadequacy of union representation and prosecution of minority
group grievances-a failing that employers have not encouraged
unions to correct and to which many employers undoubtedly have
contributed-is the weak link in the arbitration process where mi-
nority rights are concerned."7 As the process is presently consti-
through his own independent investigation, but from the record made by the
parties themselves, as presented to him at a formal arbitration hearing."
Gross, The Labor Arbitrator's Role: Tradition and Change, 25 ARB. J. (n.s.) 221, 280 (1970).
See also notes 59-63 supra & accompanying text.
This concern was expressed by the NLRB when it first considered deferring under the
Collyer rule issues of union discrimination to the arbitration process. In National Radio Co.,
198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718, 1723 (1972), the Board determined that fair resolution
could be assumed, and therefore deferral would be appropriate, only where the claimant's
interest is in "substantial harmony" with the interests of his collective bargaining representa-
tives. If it appeared likely that an employee would be victimized under the contractual
process, the Board has not deferred, but asserted de novo jurisdiction. E.g., Fleet Carrier
Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. 227, 82 L.R.R.M. 1178 (1973).
More recently the Board has given scant attention to the adequacy of union representation
of individual interests, however, when reviewing an actual award under the Spielberg rule.
See, e.g., Electronic Reprod. Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974). It
is possible that the Board's application of Spielberg in the area of union discrimination and
individual rights may be found to conflict with theAlexander principle. See notes 166-67 infra
& accompanying text.
116. 415 U.S. at 58 n.19. See also note 59 supra & accompanying text.
117. Cf. Satterwhite v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 668 (1974) (employees' right to sue under Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970), for overtime compensation held foreclosed by prior submission of
claim to contractual grievance-arbitration). In Satterwhite, decided after the Supreme
Court's Alexander decision, the court stated:
Wages and hours are at the heart of the collective-bargaining process. They
are more akin to collective rights than to individual rights, and are more suitable
to the arbitral process than Title VII rights .... The added fear expressed in
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tuted, it is not likely that union dereliction or union-employer collu-
sion will come to an arbitrator's attention. 18
In short, had the Court in Alexander focused on this legitimate
issue, accommodation logically would have followed. For, frorh the
standpoint of reform, this deficiency in the arbitration process vis-
a-vis minority grievances is more readily remediable than any inher-
ent structural deficiencies of arbitration.' Moreover, by pursuing
this line of reasoning the Court would have avoided the other ad-
verse consequences of its holding.
The Consequences of Alexander
Although Title VII did not preclude the Supreme Court in
Alexander from striking a balance between the federal policy favor-
ing labor arbitration on the one hand and the goal of equal employ-
ment opportunity on the other, the Court perceived and framed the
issue as a mutually exclusive choice. Moreover, as a result of this
judgment, the Court did not evaluate the relative merits of an ac-
commodation. Consequently, it gave insufficient consideration to
the import of its decision for the general law and practice of labor
relations. Even if the Court in Alexander had intended merely to
excise Title VII from the system of final and binding arbitration,
further reflection upon the pervasiveness of job bias issues should
have alerted the Court to the folly of its effort. Bias issues may
Gardner-Denver that harmony between a union and an individual cannot be
presumed "where a claim of racial discrimination is made,"'... has no pertin-
ence here. One of the highest objectives of any union is to get all the money
possible for all of its members.
Id. at 451.
118. This interpretation of the Court's true concern in Alexander also would explain its
contrasting willingness in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974),
to defer life-and-death safety issues to arbitration. The Court in Gateway, in an opinion again
authored by Justice Powell, held that the "'presumption of arbitrability' announced in the
Steelworkers Trilogy applies to safety disputes," and that a district court therefore could
enjoin a work stoppage over safety issues and compel arbitration under the rule of Boys
Markets. Id. at 379. It is more probable, though not certain, that in such circumstances a
union will represent employee interests adequately. See Isaacson & Zifcbak, supra note 21,
at 1415-16.
In his review of the labor law decisions of the Supreme Court for the October 1973 Term
at the 1974 Annual meeting of the Section of Labor Relations Law of the ABA, Professor
Christensen stated: "lit is hard to avoid the conclusion that ...[the Alexander and
Gateway Coal decisions] more basically reflect a different judicial view of the importance of
the rights at issue in each case." Christensen, supra note 103, at 19.
119. See notes 169-73 infra & accompanying text.
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emerge in every conceivable labor relations context and within the
scope of virtually every available statute.2 0 Discrimination is a po-
tential issue in all kinds of otherwise traditional collective bargain-
ing controversies, including disputes involving discharge, seniority,
layoff, and promotion.12'
Whether intentionally or otherwise, the Court effectively super-
imposed an uncompromising dedication to equal employment op-
portinity over a legal framework premised upon the principle of
majority rule and reared in the delicate art of compromise. If, as
Alexander indicates, Title VII affords independent protections to
minority workers inconsistent with the premises of the collective
bargaining process, and if minority rights are to supersede the prin-
ciple of majoritarianism effectively to exempt minorities from the
constraints of collective bargaining,122 including the formal pro-
cesses of industrial self-government, then the Court will have ef-
fected major upheavals in the workplace and undermined the insti-
tutions that legislate and administer its rules. The accuracy of this
judgment is demonstrated by the following review.
Arbitration of Title VH Issues
The immediate result of Alexander is that arbitration awards
disposing of Title VII discrimination claims have been stripped of
their final and binding quality; such claims, once litigated before an
arbitrator, now may return to haunt the employer or union1 23 De-
spite some indications that employers may attempt to remove Title
VII issues from arbitration on the ground that such adjudication
would be "an exercise in futility,"' ' it is doubtful that most employ-
ers will lose the incentive to submit such issues to the contractual
120. See notes 8-10 supra & accompanying text.
121. See generally ARBrrRATioN O DisCiMNNATION GRmVANCES (M. Stone & E. Bader-
schneider eds. 1974); Yeager, Work, the Law, and the Poor-A Contempory Perspective, 5
COLuM. HUwAN I GhTS L. REv. 281 (1973).
122. See, e.g., EEOC Decision 71-1804, 1973 CCH EEOC Decisions 6264 (Apr. 19, 1971),
holding that picketing in protest of racial discrimination is protected by Section 704(a) of
Title VII, notwithstanding existence of no-strike clause in applicable collective bargaining
agreement. See also discussion of the Western Addition decision in note 16 supra.
123. Several courts have held, under the 1972 amendments to Title VII, see notes 4, 6
supra, that no statute of limitations bars the EEOC from filing a suit in federal court. E.g.,
EEOC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 487 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1974).
124. Office of Economic Opportunity, Inc., 63 Lab. Arb. 692 (1974) (Miller, Arbitrator);
Whitfield Tank Lines, Inc., 62 Lab. Arb. 934,938 (1974) (Cohen, Arbitrator); KnightNewspa-
pers, Inc., 58 Lab. Arb. 446 (1972) (Platt, Arbitrator).
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grievance-arbitration process or seek to abandon the arbitration
remedy altogether. Practically, employers still have more to gain
than lose from retaining grievance arbitration. At least for a range
of employment disputes, the agreement to arbitrate remains the
quid pro quo for the union's promise not to strike. 12 Furthermore,
to the extent that the employer is made aware of the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of certain employment practices by adjudication, it is
to his advantage to obtain a determination as soon as possible.2
Finally, any attempt to limit by contract the jurisdiction of arbitra-
tors over Title VII cases, for example by deleting nondiscrimination
clauses, most likely would itself be violative of Title VII; 121 a union
might be found to have breached its duty of fair representation by
agreement to such limitations.2
Similarly, the grievant is subject to both practical and legal re-
straints in deciding whether to pursue his claim to arbitration. Real-
istically he has little to lose and everything to gain by arbitration.
If he wins, it is unlikely that he will proceed further under Title VII;
redress thus would have been secured through a relatively inexpen-
sive and expeditious process. 29 Furthermore, the ever-present threat
of subsequent Title VII litigation provides the grievant with tremen-
dous leverage to obtain a favorable settlement.
Often overlooked or misconstrued is the applicability in the Title
VII context"' of the general principle that a complaining employee
125. As Justice Powell correctly noted in Alexander:
The primary incentive for an employer to enter into an arbitration agreement
is the union's reciprocal promise not to strike. . . . It is not unreasonable to
assume that most employers will regard the benefits derived from a no-strike
pledge as outweighing whatever costs may result from according employees an
arbitral remedy against discrimination in addition to their judicial remedy
under Title VII.
415 U.S. at 54-55.
126. Coulson, Preface to ARBirRATiON OF DiscnmAmoN GRmVANcEs 3, 5 (M. Stone & E.
Badersehneider eds. 1974). Additionally, for the probable majority of cases, which are ac-
corded de facto finality because of a grievant's failure to pursue statutory remedies, the
employer gains from arbitration expeditious settlement of the dispute, a benefit which is "of
prime importance in resolving conflicts." N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1975, at 58, col. 3 (statement
of Robert Coulson, President, American Arbitration Association).
127. See Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891 (D. Me. 1970).
128. Meltzer, supra note 87, at 8; Judicial Review, supra note 24, at 131.
129. Judicial Review, supra note 24, at 130-31, 142.
130. See Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d 743,747 (6th Cir. 1971); Spann v. Kaywood Div.,
Joanna W. Mills Co., 446 F.2d 120, 122-23 (6th Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works,
502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974); Labor Arbitration, supra note 2, at 45; cf. Oubichon v. North
Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569,572 (9th Cir. 1973); Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d
54, 57 (5th Cir. 1972).
19751
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
first must exhaust his administrative or contractual remedies before
resorting to the courts for redress from contractual injury.'"' The
holding in Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 32 created an excep-
tion to the general rule in cases involving racial discrimination only
when the petitioning party demonstrates that a formal "attempt to
exhaust contractual remedies, 13 3 has been made and that "the ef-
fort to proceed formally with contractual or administrative remedies
would be wholly futile."'3 Therefore, in many instances a grievant
may be compelled to arbitrate discrimination grievances.
Nevertheless, while these factors still favor resort to arbitration,
Alexander leaves the parties to collective bargaining in confusion as
to the direction in which they should develop the arbitral remedy.
Justice Powell's assertions notwithstanding, arbitration today is
more elaborate, more professional, and more frequently utilized
than ever before.135 Increasingly it has taken on the trappings of the
courtroom, in terms of both judicial due process and the sources of
guiding legal principles, while institutions operating at the national
level screen and make available to the industrial community lists
of professional arbitrators. 13
Much of the increased complexity and technicality of arbitration
results in turn from increased complexity in the employment rela-
tionship and the collective bargaining process, but many refine-
ments stem from a desire on the part of both labor and management
to improve the process to decrease the likelihood of economic con-
flict and governmental intervention.'37 Alexander, however, raises
serious questions about the inevitability of arbitration as an accep-
table quasi-public forum in the scheme of industrial self-govern-
131. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
132. 393 U.S. 324 (1989).
133. Id. at 331.
134. Id. at 330. In Glover plaintiffs specifically alleged that the employer and union were
aligned against them and that the union repeatedly had refused to process their grievances.
Id. at 326.
135. The fact that, as of 1975, approximately 96 percent of labor agreements contained
provision for grievance-arbitration procedures, 2 BNA COLLEcriVE BARGAINING NEGOT. &
CoNT. 51:6 (1975), substantiates the statement of the Supreme Court that "arbitration of
labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective
bargaining process itself." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960).
136. These organizations include the American Arbitration Association, the National
Academy of Arbitrators, and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
137. See Shabecoff, Growth of Arbitration Appears to Point to Era of Labor Peace, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 22, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
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ment, notably in those disputes raising civil rights issues. Upon
further reflection, labor and management may persuade themselves
that quasi-judicial arbitration is a luxury whose growing cost"' is no
longer justified and that their money and energy can be chanheled
more profitably in other directions to avoid continual relitigation of
discrimination issues."' Realistically, an arbitration award adverse
to the grievant, regardless of the degree to which an atmosphere of
impartiality and fairness in the process has been achieved, may not
always end the matter. Conversely, -employers are not so enamored
of arbitration' that they will acquiesce in awards that decree ex-
traordinaryrelief, such as the restructuring of seniority progression
lines, without a definitive statement by a federal court.
Thus, while employers may attempt to resolve discrimination
claims in the initial informal stages of grievance procedures or by
means of extracontractual processes,' they may resist settlement
by a contractual arbitrator. The employer may contend that a par-
ticular controversy, though placed within the arbitrator's jurisdic-
tion by an antidiscrimination clause in the contract, should be re-
served for the courts or the EEOC either because of its complexity
or because it casts doubt upon the lawfulness of an operative clause
in the agreement, in which case the arbitrator should effectuate the
intentions of the parties as expressed in the contract.4 2 Given the
enormous backlog of Title VII cases in the EEOC1'3 and the crowded
dockets in the federal courts generally, such a stratagem may gain
for the employer a desired delay.
138. The average cost of an arbitrator's services is more than $500. Although hearing times
average less than one day, time for travel and case study increase the average billed time to
approximately three days. Average daily rates had increased to $156.83 by 1970. Kilberg, The
FMCS and Arbitration: Problems and Prospects, MONTHLY LAB. RaV., April 1971, 40, 41. In
1973, the average length of time from the initiation of a grievance until the issuance of the
arbitrator's award was 257 days. See Usery, Appeal for More Efficient Arbitration, in LAnor
RELATIONS YEARooic-1973, at 115 (BNA) (remarks by director of Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service before Labor-Management Arbitration Conference sponsored by Ameri-
can Arbitration Association, in Cleveland, Ohio.)
139. See notes 169-73 infra & accompanying text.
140. See McDermott, Arbitrabilifty: The Courts Versus the Arbitrator, 23 AnB. J. (n.s.) 18,
29-30 (1968). See also Smith & Jones, The Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance
Arbitration on Judges, Arbitrators and Parties, 52 VA. L. REV. 831, 885.912 (1966).
141. See Coulson, Equal Employment Arbitration After Gardner-Denver, N.Y. Law J.,
Mar. 13, 1974, at 4, col. 5; notes 169-73 infra & accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 727 (1967) (Kahn, Arbitrator). See also
Labor Arbitration, supra note 2, at 48-49. See note 93 supra.
143. See note 10 supra.
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Nor is admission of an award as evidence in a Title VII proceeding
as decreed by Alexander44 likely to provide sufficient incentive to
an employer to litigate vigorously job bias issues at the arbitration
level. Because these issues must be relitigated de novo, the possibil-
ity that the award alone will be given dispositive weight by a court
may be too speculative to be of practical significance in the formula-
tion of specific arbitration strategy.
In short, the time, energy, and money expended to sophisticate
arbitration simply may no longer be worthwhile to an employer or,
in many circumstances, a union. Not only has arbitration lost its
most valued characteristic, finality, in the area of civil rights, the
possibility remains that arbitration is a legally insufficient quid pro
quo for a minority group's forfeiture of its right to strike.'45 Unless
the Court changes its position, therefore, any impetus to improve
the private dispute resolution process as it affects racial discrimina-
tion issues will come at the level of grievance adjustment short of
formal contract arbitration where, as the Court indicated in
Alexander, "a voluntary settlement [of a grievance] expressly con-
ditioned on a waiver of petitioner's cause of action under Title VII"
may assure the finality desired by an employer. ' The emphasis will
shift to the informal "conciliatory and therapeutic" characteristics
of grievance arbitration, away from the formal adversary aspects.'47
The National Labor Relations Board and the Spielberg-Collyer
Doctrine of Deferral
Alexander also has threatened the viability of the National Labor
Relations Board's expressed preference for arbitration of disputes
fundamentally contractual in nature. Encouraged by the federal
policy favoring private arbitration of industrial disputes, reaffirmed
144. 415 U.S. at 60.
145. Although the Supreme Court in The Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Community Organization, 95 S. Ct. 976 (1975) held that the attempts of minority group
employees to bypass established grievance procedures and bargain separately with the em-
ployer over discrimination issues are unprotected activity under the LMRA, it left unresolved
the issue whether such self-help measures by minorities are protected under Title VII, specifi-
cally when there is an exclusive bargaining representative. If they are, an applicable no.strike
clause therefore would not be binding on the minority group, and the employer's major
incentive to arbitrate discrimination disputes would evaporate. See notes 16, 122 supra.
146. 415 U.S. at 52 n.15.
147. Id. at 55. See Coulson, supra note 141. See also notes 169-73 infra & accompanying
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as recently as 19748 and well established in opinions of the Su-
preme Court,"' the NLRB over the past two decades has achieved
an accommodation between its own plenary power to hear employ-
ment disputes involving unfair labor practices and the private rem-
edy of consensual arbitration. The landmark Spielberg Manufactur-
ing Co.' 0 decision established the principle of agency deferral to
prior awards that dispose of statutory issues in the course of a fair
and equitable arbitration of disputes arising out of collective bar-
gaining agreements.
Spielberg established three guidelines to determine the propriety
of deferral to arbitration: the arbitration proceeding must have been
fair and regular on its face; all parties under the contract must have
agreed to be bound by the arbitration award; and the decision of the
arbitrator must not be repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
LMRA.'51 Upon satisfaction of these three criteria and a fourth es-
tablished by subsequent case law-that the particular allegedly un-
fair practice must have been presented to and considered by the
arbitrator 52-- the Board generally has stayed its hand. 53
More recently, the NLRB has broadened the deferral concept to
encompass disputes not yet submitted to arbitration. In Collyer In-
sulated Wire, 5' one of its most important decisions in recent years,
the Board held that it would suspend its jurisdiction over unfair
labor practice cases involving contractual issues pending exhaustion
of grievance-arbitration procedures by the parties. 5 The Board has
extended greatly the parameters of Collyer in the last four years,
according considerable discretion to arbitrators over an array of
statutory issues. 5 The Spielberg and Collyer principles together
reflect in large part the Board's continued confidence in the integ-
rity of the voluntary arbitration process and its belief in the reason-
able probability that arbitration will dispose of statutory issues in
148. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 377 (1974).
149. See note 89 supra.
150. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
151. Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153. See also International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B.
923, 51 L..R.M. 1155 (1962), affd sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRE, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
152. See, e.g., Airco Indus. Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 79 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1972); Monsanto
Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451 (1961); cf. note 166 infra.
153. See, e.g., Gulf States Asphalt Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 938, 82 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1972).
154. 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
155. Id. at 843, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1937.
156. See generally Isaacson & Zifchak, supra note 21, at 1392-1401.
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a proper manner. The deferral guidelines established by both
Spielberg and Collyer have been sustained repeatedly and unani-
mously by the federal courts as a proper exercise of Board discre-
tion;'57 indeed, dicta in a post-Alexander Supreme Court decision'58
and in Alexander itself 59 indicate Supreme Court concurrence in the
tenets of the Board's deferral doctrine.
Yet nearly all of the arguments advanced by the Court in
Alexander'5 for dismissing a deferral rule in the Title VII context
are applicable, at least in part, to deferral as practiced by the Board
under the LMRA. Specifically, Alexander challenges the propriety
of deferral if individual employee rights are protected by a supersed-
ing statute. Inherent in the Court's refusal to adopt a deferral rule
in Alexander is the notion that Title VII grants rights to individual
employees that a union is incapable of waiving through the process
of collective bargaining."' It logically follows that those rights can-
not be compromised by limiting, pursuant to contract, the forum in
which they may be adjudicated to one controlled entirely by labor
and management. 6 ?
Deference nonetheless has been accorded by the Board to arbitra-
tion of distinct statutory rights analogous to those under Title VII,
157. See, e.g., Local 715, IBEW v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Local 2188,
BEW v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 61 (1974); Provision
Houseworkers v. NLRB, 493 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 47 (1974); Enterprise
Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 493 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1974); Associated Press v. NLRB, 492 F.2d
662 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB, 479 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973).
158. William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1974).
159. 415 U.S. at 56 n.17.
160. See notes 104-08 supra & accompanying text.
161. Justice Powell emphasized the individual nature of Title VII rights as follows:
[W]e think it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's
rights under Title VII. It is true, of course, that a union may waive certain
statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the right to strike ...
These rights are conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of
bargaining and properly may be exercised or relinquished by the union as
collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for unit members. Title
VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it concerns not
majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment opportu-
nities. Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command
that each employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the
rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining process since
waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind
Title VII.
415 U.S. at 51 (citations omitted).
162. Id. at 52.
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as well as issues addressed to the integrity of the collective bargain-
ing process. For example, the LMRA requires that the Board protect
the right of the individual employee to engage in or refrain from
engaging in organizational activity. 6 3 Specifically provided by stat-
ute are protections against interference, coercion, and discrimina-
tion, whether engaged in by an employer or a union,' 4 for the pur-
pose of discouraging or encouraging such activity. Increasingly, the
Board also has been reading restraints against racial discrimination
into the protections of the Act.1 5 These organizational and fair em-
ployment rights are as susceptible to compromise by the collective
bargaining process as are Title VII rights. Nevertheless, the Board
frequently has deemed it appropriate to defer claims of union dis-
crimination to arbitration, thereby precluding individual grievants
from access to the statutory forum for a de novo hearing.' If the
163. Labor Management Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
164. The LMRA makes it an unfair labor practice for employers-"to interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157," 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1); or "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization,"
id. § 158(a)(3). Similar prohibitions apply to labor organizations, see id. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), (2).
165. See, e.g., Bekins Moving & Storage, 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974).
See note 16 supra.
166. See, e.g., National Radio Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 84 L.R.R.M. 1105 (1973).
Moreover, in doing so in the past, the Board rarely gave more than cursory consideration to
the adequacy of the union's representation of the individual grievant before the arbitrator.
Atleson, Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20 BurFAL O L. REv. 355
(1971). Rather, the Board's major concern on review has been the more straightforward
question of whether the arbitrator considered the statutory issue. See, e.g., McLean Trucking
Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 710, 82 L.R.R.M. 1652 (1973), remanded sub nom. Banyard v. NLRB, 505
F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Fleet Distrib. Serv., 200 N.L.R.B. 196, 81 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1972).
This approach is in line with the primary impetus for the Spielberg rule, the fostering of
industrial self-government and consequent discouragement of dual litigation.
Recently the Board has taken this principle a major, and highly questionable, step further.
In Electronic Reprod. Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974), the Board,
in a reversal of prior case law, held that henceforth the Board should give "full effect to
arbitration awards dealing with discipline or discharge cases, under Spielberg, except when
unusual circumstances are shown which demonstrate that there were bona fide reasons, other
than a mere desire on the part of one party to try the same set of facts before two forums,
which caused the failure to introduce such evidence at the arbitration proceeding. . . ." Id.
at__, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1216. Accordingly, deferral under Spielberg generally is appropriate
even though the record does not disclose whether the statutory issue was raised or litigated
before the arbitrator, provided only that the issue appropriately could and should have been
submitted to the arbitrator under the applicable collective agreement. Id. at - 87
L.R.R.M. at 1216, 1218. Obviously buoyed by the widespread judicial acceptance of the
Spielberg-Collyer doctrine, the majority in Electronic Reproduction Services characterized
as "tunnel vision" the dissenters' argument that Alexander has discredited that doctrine and
mandated that statutory rights must be vindicated in a public forum:
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clear import of Alexander is that under no circumstances may the
access of aggrieved employees to statutory remedies be frustrated by
deference to private contractual arbitration, then it is difficult to see
how Alexander and Spielberg-Collyer can exist side-by-side in the
area of individual or minority rights.'67
FAIR EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION TOMORROW
Only a few of the areas of confusion and potential conflict gener-
ated by the Alexander decision for the arbitration process have been
examined in this Article. The radical change in emphasis decreed
by that opinion should precipitate concomitant changes in the for-
mat of the arbitration process and the premises that heretofore have
sustained it as an institution. This final section contemplates the
internal and external forces which, if set in motion, could assure
Their fundamental error lies in the narrowness of their vision which has led them
to ignore that the Board's jurisdiction is intended as but one means of achieving
that peaceful, orderly, and fair resolution of industrial disputes which was the
primary congressional focus and which is the chief objective of our statute. That
kind of tunnel vision assumes that our Act, like the Civil Rights Act, is designed
to eliminate a specific morally and socially condemned practice. That is, indeed,
the specific purpose of the Civil Rights Act, which is aimed directly at elimina-
tion of discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
But the National Labor Relations Act has a quite different kind of purpose,
and therefore the accommodation of procedures under this Act must be viewed
quite differently from those under the Civil Rights Act. The prohibitions in our
Act of "unfair labor practices," rather than being designed to eliminate, insofar
as possible, certain specific evils, are instead designed only as an integral part
of a comprehensive regulatory scheme designed to promote industrial peace and
to eliminate the obstacles to the free flow of commerce which Congress con-
cluded had resulted from industrial strife.
Id. at---, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1217 (emphasis supplied). The majority, straining to distinguish
the statutory scheme under the LMRA from that under the Civil Rights Act, in fact demon-
strates "tunnel vision" of the sort suffered by the Supreme Court in Alexander. Particularly
in the area of individual employee rights, this latest decision is likely to bring the Board's
Spielberg doctrine into sharp conflict with Alexander in the courts. See Banyard v. NLRB,
505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Radioear Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 87 L.R.R.M.
1330 (1974).
167. See Electronic Reprod. Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211, 1219
(1974) (Fanning & Jenkins, Members, concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because of
the judicial support that the Spielberg-Collyer doctrine has received, it is unlikely that
Alexander will be construed to discredit the Board's deferral rule per se as applied to most
arbitration awards involving majoritarian issues, especially in light of the considerable differ-
ences in purpose between Title VII and the LMRA as administered in this area. See Meltzer,
supra note 87; Teple, Deferral to Arbitration: Implications of NLRB Policy, 29 ARB. J. (n.s.)
65, 91 (1974).
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that the metamorphosis of arbitration in the area of individual
rights is salutary.
Theoretically the uncompromising commitment to equal employ-
ment opportunity signaled by Alexander would, if carried to its
logical extreme, shift the present remedial system from private con-
sensual forums to the federal courts, the "final arbiters" of Title VII
rights. Realistically, however, the availability of private processes
will remain an absolute necessity if fair employment rights in fact
are to be vindicated. Present indications are that both the EEOC
and the courts would choke on their backlog of Title VII claims if a
conscious effort is made to administer the statute exclusively
through litigation.' s  Assuming, therefore, that institutional con-
straints enhance the probability that the grievance-arbitration pro-
cess will continue to play a meaningful role in the enforcement of
Title VII rights, the necessary task is to determine the best use of
the arbitral remedy in the post-Alexander era to further the inter-
ests of all parties.
Arbitration Outside the Bargaining Agreement
Given the previously noted169 possibility that after Alexander
employers would channel their energies in directions other than
traditional arbitration, it is likely that they will concentrate on the
development and implementation of ad hoc extracontractual reme-
dies. Such traditional dispute resolution techniques as mediation
and binding arbitration are readily adaptable to this new environ-
ment: when contracted for by a Title VII grievant on an ad hoc basis
and conditioned upon a knowing waiver of his statutory cause of
action, they will contribute significantly to the Title VII remedial
scheme. As a result of the Alexander decision, employers have great
incentive to promote the use of such ad hoc measures for the normal
range of job bias disputes because they offer a degree of finality no
longer guaranteed by traditional arbitration.1Y0
Such arbitration or conciliation agreements might be negotiated
on an ad hoc basis or provided for in the collective bargaining agree-
168. The EEOC has an estimated backlog of 85,000 cases; it predicts that 40 percent of
these cases eventually will wind up in court. ABA REro'rr, supra note 10, at 45.
169. See notes 141, 145-47 supra & accompanying text.
170. See 415 U.S. at 52 & n.15. The Court indicated that a voluntary settlement contracted
for by the complainant on the condition that he waive his Title VII cause of action would
constitute a legitimate waiver. See note 146 supra & accompanying text.
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ment as a remedial track parallel to the normal grievance-
arbitration route." ' Obviously, extracontractual tribunals must
exhibit characteristics appropriate to safeguard Title VII rights, in-
cluding assurances of active participation by the grievant or his
representative in selection of the arbitrator, intervention as of right
in the arbitral proceeding, and the availability of independent coun-
sel to the grievant. The stress would be upon the conciliatory quali-
ties of the process and the creation of an atmosphere of fair dealing
which would encourage the individual grievant to accept the re-
sult.72 The use of arbitrators and mediators who are minority-group
members or otherwise demonstrate a sensitivity to Title VII obliga-
tions would facilitate acceptance of awards by complaining employ-
ees.
73
The Role of the Commission
Its prestige and importance enhanced by the Alexander decision,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission can play an in-
creasingly significant role in Title VII enforcement through use of
its leverage'74 to obtain voluntary and amicable settlements. The
former Chairman of the Commission, John H. Powell, Jr., had indi-
cated publicly that voluntary settlements in the nature of binding
arbitration may be an appropriate vehicle of conciliation. 75 Toward
171. Blumrosen, Labor Arbitration and Discrimination: The Situation After Griggs and
Rios, 28 ARB. J. (n.s.) 145, 156-58 (1973) (model arbitration clause relating to allegations of
discrimination). See Coulson, supra note 141. See also Sims v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local
65, 353 F. Supp. 22, 31-32 (N.D. Ohio 1972), remanded on other grounds, 489 F.2d 1023 (6th
Cir. 1973) (complaint procedure under affirmative action program written to provide for final
and binding arbitration).
172. Coulson, supra note 141.
173. Aksen, Changing Patterns in Labor Arbitration, in LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1973,
at 237, 243-44 (V. Randall ed. 1973) (Proceedings of the 19th Annual Institute on Labor Law,
Southwestern Legal Foundation).
174. Probably the most significant development affecting the stature of the EEOC has
been the 1972 amendment of Title VII to provide the Commission with direct court enforce-
ment powers, including sole responsibility for pattern or practice suits. See notes 4, 6 supra.
The agency already has approximately 300 lawsuits pending in federal court; moreover, this
authority has enabled the Commission to increase its conciliation success rate to almost 50
percent. Address by then EEOC Chairman Powell, ABA Section on Labor Relations Law
National Institute, Washington, D.C., May 8, 1974 (unpublished).
175. Former Chairman Powell indicated in 1974 that the EEOC staff was giving serious
consideration to the possibility of including provisions in conciliation agreements for arbitra-
tion of future discrimination charges. Because 50 percent of all charges concern 10 percent of
all respondents, and 15 percent concern 1 percent of all respondents, the implementation of
such a procedure would be a significant contribution. Address by Chairman Powell, supra
[Vol. 16:439
TITLE VII FORUMS
this end the Commission should promulgate administrative guide-
lines for agency deferral to such voluntary procedures. Thus, where
the parties already have institutionalized ad hoc grievance-
arbitration machinery, the EEOC should suspend further process-
ing of a charge pending arbitration in a fashion similar to the
NLRB's Collyer doctrine, if there is a strong likelihood that the
process can and will resolve the dispute consistent with the statute.
Where no extracontractual procedures previously have been used by
the parties, the Commission should promote them in the course of
conciliation efforts. Such processes would be required to contain
adequate Title VII safeguards, the implementation of which should
be a leading concern of the Commission."' Actual awards emanat-
ing from these procedures could be subject to review, as in
Spielberg, and deference accorded in appropriate circumstances
through issuance of a "no reasonable cause" order. The Commission
would have a vested interest in promoting voluntary resort to
private remedies which it has scrutinized and certified as accepta-
ble.
Litigation in the Federal Courts
Once a Title VII lawsuit reaches a federal district court, an even-
tuality that should continue to occur in only a minority of cases
originally filed with the EEOC,17 there are certain steps that the
court may take, consistent with its statutory role as the "final arbi-
ter" of Title VII disputes, to foster private settlement of appropriate
claims. The 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act mandate that
note 174. See also Isaacson & zifchak, supra note 21, at 1411 n.153.
176. Obviously the Commission should defer to arbitration under a conciliation agreement,
the negotiation of which it had supervised initially. Similarly, where the parties have insti-
tuted an agreement to arbitrate independent of the Commission, the EEOC again should
defer, if equivalent safeguards are present. The Commission could promulgate a model
grievance-arbitration procedure for parties to adopt; in the alternative it could approve or
reject various formal proposals submitted by the parties themselves. In either case an accept-
able procedure should include measures for conciliation short of arbitration, including: possi-
ble intervention by a mediator; making the grievant a party to all proceedings and providing
him with qualified counsel throughout the entire procedure; providing for submission of an
unresolved grievance to an impartial arbitrator who is selected by the Commission or other-
wise certified as knowledgeable in fair employment law, and who has jurisdiction to resolve
any statutory issues. Either the procedure itself or a satisfactory settlement resulting there-
from would constitute the quid pro quo for the waiver of a grievant's statutory cause of action.
See generally Blumrosen, supra note 171, at 153-58; Coulson, supra note 141; Labor
Arbitration, supra note 2, at 65-68.
177. See ABA RPonr, supra, note 10, at 45.
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Title VII cases receive priority and expeditious processing.178 If a
case has not been scheduled for trial within 120 days, the judge is
empowered to appoint a master pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."' Depending upon the authority vested in
him, the master may hear the case and function in some respects
as a judge in a civil proceeding.8 0
The 1972 amendments seem to imply that masters should be
employed whenever possible.'81 A master, as an officer of the court,
would be independent of the control of the parties to collective
bargaining and would hear the cause in an adversary context in
which the claimant is a party and is represented either by private
counsel or the EEOC. It would not be inconsistent with the
Alexander decision therefore for district judges to defer to the rul-
ings of a master almost as a matter of routine, particularly after a
cadre of masters skilled in Title VII principles has developed. As-
suming certain other conditions are satisfied, the next logical step,
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2)(Supp. II, 1972) provides in part: "It shall be the duty of a
court having jurisdiction over proceedings under this section to assign cases for hearing at
the earliest practicable date and to cause such cases to be in every way expedited." See also
id. § 2000e-5(f)(5); notes 4, 6 supra.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.5(f)(5) (Supp. II, 1972).
180. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 53(c), which provides:
The order of reference to the master may specify or limit his powers and may
direct him to report only upon particular issues or to do or perform particular
acts or to receive and report evidence only and may fix the time and place for
beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's report.
Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the master has
and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before
him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient
performance of his duties under the order. He may require the production before
him of evidence upon all matters embraced in the raference, including the
prodution of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and writings applicable
thereto. He may rule upon the admissibility of evidence unless otherwise di-
rected by the order of reference and has the authority to put witnesses on oath
and may himself examine them and may call the parties to the action and
examine them upon oath. When a party so requests, the master shall make a
record of the evidence offered and excluded in the same manner end subject to
the same limitations as provided in Rule 4 3(c) for a court sitting without a jury.
181. Compare 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(5) (Supp. H, 1972) with FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) ("A
reference to a master shall be the exception end not the rule. . . .[TIn actions to be tried
without a jury, .. .a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional
condition requires it."). See also Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 9 FEP CAsEs 158 (7th Cir.
1974) (district court's local magistrate rule providing that employment discrimination cases
be assigned directly to magistrate rather than district judge held invalid because only a judge
may assign such a case end he may do so only after his determination that the case cannot
be heard within 120 days after joinder of issue).
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albeit some time far in the future, would be court deferral to an
award issued by an arbitrator, previously certified for master status
and appointed by the parties, with the possible participation of the
EEOC. Such a procedure, bearing the imprimatur of -the federal
courts, should withstand any objections premised upon either the
stated rationale or underlying considerations of the Alexander deci-
sion.
CONCLUSION
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. presented the Supreme Court
with a vehicle, serviceable although not ideal, for reaching a reason-
able accommodation between the rights of the individual as guaran-
teed under Title VII and the rights of the group as expressed in their
collective institutions and procedures. The Court chose to come
down squarely in support of the individual without seeming to take
into account the needs of the group. By comparing the contract
arbitration process unfavorably, and unfairly, with the judicial
forum designated by statute, the Court has injured all parties in-
volved by taking from them a valuable adjudicatory tool. Moreover,
this rejection of arbitration in the Title VII context has raised seri-
ous questions about the continued usefulness of deferral in any field
of labor relations law where there is a need to protect individual
statutory rights.
Despite this setback, the process of accommodation must go for-
ward. The absence of realistic alternatives demands that efforts be
made to adapt the arbitral process to the needs of equal employ-
ment opportunity. If the underlying premise of Alexander has been
discerned correctly, such adaptation should take the form of modifi-
cations to the process, of an extracontractual nature, to purge the
deficiencies that now make arbitration an unsuitable Title VII
forum. The parties to collective bargaining, the EEOC, and the
courts are capable of this effort; the issue therefore is not whether
the process of accommodation will go forward, but how difficult will
be its course.
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